### 1nc 1

#### A. Text –In an appropriate test case, the United States Supreme Court should issue a narrow ruling that federal authority over normalizing trade relations on Cuba commandeers the states’ legislative functions in violation of the 10th and 11th Amendments. The Supreme Court should devolve authority of this narrow ruling to the State Governments and United States Territories. The 50 States and relevant U.S. territories should normalize trade relations with Cuba.

**B. Solvency –**

**1. The Court can make this ruling and devolve power to the states – it won’t be rolled back**

**Miller ’98** (Mark A., Attorney at Law – Baker Botts LLP, Cleveland State Law Review, Lexis)

The history of the Tenth Amendment is an appropriate starting point in the development of substantive federalism. For a long period of time, the Tenth Amendment operated as nothing more than a plain statement of the obvious that afforded little protection to the states. [249](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n249" \t "_self) In the aftermath of Garcia, state sovereignty was left to the political processes. [250](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n250" \t "_self) Tenth Amendment power was reborn in New York v. United States when the Court held that Congress could not commandeer the states' legislative function. [251](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n251" \t "_self) This protection is decreed no matter how strong the federal interest in the legislation may be. [252](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n252" \t "_self) Protections over state sovereignty were expanded again in the 1996 Term when the Court invalidated certain portions of the Brady Act. [253](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n253" \t "_self) According to Printz, Congress cannot force the states' executive branches to enact federal regulatory programs regardless of the federal interest involved. [254](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n254" \t "_self) Whenever the structural framework of dual sovereignty is compromised, the Tenth Amendment steps in to prevent a usurpation of federalism. [255](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n255" \t "_self) Printz and New York held that Congress was incapable of commanding the states to take a course of action that it could not undertake directly. [256](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n256" \t "_self) But what happens if Congress breaches the Tenth Amendment through an Article I power like the Spending Clause? Do the Court's enunciated protections extend to Article I? These are the questions that the theory of substantive federalism answers. The restraint on Article I began, to large extent, in Garcia when Justice O'Connor predicted that the Commerce power would be affirmatively limited  [\*191]  by state autonomy. [257](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n257" \t "_self) The door was further opened in New York when the plenary nature of the Commerce Clause was labeled as "subversive" to the interests of state sovereignty. [258](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n258" \t "_self) United States v. Lopez put the first nail in the coffin when it struck down an exercise of the Commerce power as going so far as to approach a "police power of the sort retained by the States." [259](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n259" \t "_self) The Commerce Clause, in other words, authorizes control over interstate commerce, but does not authorize regulation of the states. [260](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n260" \t "_self) Seminole Tribe, however, lends the greatest support to the substantive federalism theory. The Eleventh Amendment -- a core guardian of state sovereign interests [261](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcaa10b310f9de337b9938cdd82ef973&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAB&_md5=1ec44602f1f617c819e7467251f43a5a" \l "n261" \t "_self) -- withstands any attempt by Congress to pierce the shield of federalism with Article I.

**2. Currently all 50 states and US territories conduct foreign policy on a wide array of issues especially in the realm of economy and trade – they have acted collectively in these areas and in Latin America**

Daniel **Halberstam**, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, [46 Vill. L. Rev. 1015] 20**01**

State and local governments have also engaged in foreign policy initiatives with more "political" goals in mind, that is, to promote policies unrelated to their own economic development. n90 Sometimes these "political" activities are difficult to distinguish from the more basic **economic** and cultural **engagement** of which they are a part. At other times, the principal purpose of the action is clearly the "political" goal itself. Here, too, we see prominent instances, particularly of collective state and local action, in which such **engagement** may be considered useful for the Nation as a whole. Cities, Counties, and States, for example, have forged formalized ties across national boundaries, which promote business, professional, cultural, and educational exchanges as well as advancing political engagement more generally. Currently, 1300 U.S. communities have established formal links with 2400 of their counterparts in 137 nations, and all fifty States, as well as American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C., have formed a total of 201 relationships with subnational units of government in approximately fifty foreign nations. n91 In some instances, these relationships preceded formal diplomatic ties at the national level, as in the case of **Cuba**, where at least six U.S. cities have sister city relationships with Cuban counterparts. n92 In others, sister city relationships were used to bring into focus human rights and social justice issues otherwise neglected by the federal government. n93 Local officials have used visits to [\*1033] highlight political issues, n94 and even trade missions have taken on significant political content, as when Idaho sponsored missions to Libya in the 1970s and hosted Libyan missions in the United States. n95 Trade, development and politics are similarly intertwined when the U.S. Conference of Mayors pursues the creation of an international alliance with counterparts throughout the world, engages Chinese mayors in the form of a cooperative agreement and promotes cooperation in the Middle East. n96 Beyond such hybrid activities, many cities and counties have formally expressed their views on a host of foreign policy matters, including the Vietnam War, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the status of Taiwan and nuclear disarmament. n97 Others have gone further and limited their investments, much in the way Massachusetts did with its procurement regulations, in order to further political objectives. n98 Yet other state and local officials have obstructed the movement of foreign officials in the United States based on foreign policy considerations. n99 [\*1034] More significantly, state and local governments have in recent history intervened collectively in several foreign policy issues that ultimately became issues of national importance. In these instances, the States dramatically imposed economic and regulatory pressures to make their voices heard at national and international levels. And while federal officials have criticized these actions along the way, the federal government ultimately took up these concerns and in some cases embraced subnational government views in resolving the underlying issue.

**C. Competition – Raich crushed Federalism – extending Lopez is critical to revive it**

Brandon J. **Stoker**, J.D. Candidate 2010, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, [23 BYU J. Pub. L. 317] 20**09**

When the Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. Raich n2 in 2005, it marked the first occasion in over a decade that the Court broadly construed the Commerce Clause to permit federal regulation of intrastate activity. More importantly, Raich signaled an abrupt end to the Rehnquist Court's "federalism revolution" by circumscribing three recent cases delineating meaningful limits on Congress's Commerce Clause powers. n3 It represents the boldest assertion of congressional power to "regulate commerce ... among the several states" in the history of the Court. n4 Indeed, Raich and its progeny threaten to undermine the delicate balance of federal and state power structurally imbued in our constitutional republic by acquiescing to the unbridled exercise of federal power. Though some have expressed skepticism about the ostensibly broad effect Raich might have on federalism jurisprudence, recent circuit court cases decided pursuant to the standards set forth in Raich demonstrate federal appropriation of "core" state powers, [5](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=e30059ac5d5adcfa2a9c1b95d18cad35&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkAl&_md5=91abe5cb878db92dca10c76114c1a8f7" \l "n5" \t "_self) including, in particular, state police powers. This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should limit Raich by reviving the limitation on congressional regulation of noneconomic intrastate activity to circumstances where failure to regulate such activity [\*318] would undermine a broader regulatory program. The Court should also narrowly confine Raich's definition of "economic activity" to prevent lower courts from "piling inference upon inference" to demonstrate otherwise tenuous connections to interstate commerce. This approach would not require the Court to overrule Raich, but merely to enforce the clear standards articulated in United States v. Lopez n6 and United States v. Morrison.

**Federalism is key to prevent federal overstretch – controls** root cause **of general terrorism, economic collapse, and Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan**

**Nivola 10** (Pietro S. Nivola, senior fellow and C. Douglas Dillon Chair in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, “Rebalancing American Federalism,” The American Interest, March-April 2010, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=787)

Thinking along those lines warrants renewed emphasis today. America’s national government has had its hands full coping with a deep and lingering economic crisis and onerous security challenges around the world. It cannot, or at any rate ought not, keep piling on top of those daunting tasks a second-tier agenda that injudiciously dabbles in too many decisions and duties best consigned to local entities. Turning every imaginable issue into a Federal case, so to speak, diverts and polarizes political leaders at the national level, and erodes recognition of local responsibilities. A kind of attention deficit disorder besets anybody who attempts to do a little of everything rather than a few important things well. Although not a root cause of catastrophes like the submersion of a historic American city by a hurricane in 2005, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the great financial bust of 2008 or the successful resurgence of the Taliban in Central Asia, an overstretched and distracted government stands less chance of mitigating such tragedies.

**Extinction**

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand – Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), July)

*A Catalytic Response: Dragging in the Major Nuclear Powers*

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,[40](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0040) and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”[41](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0041) Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”[42](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/smpp/section?content=a923238837&fulltext=713240928#EN0042) American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

### 1nc 2

#### Prices rising but balanced now --- most predictive evidence

**MarketWatch 9-11** (“Goldman: Upside risk to oil prices in near term”, 2013, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-upside-risk-to-oil-prices-in-near-term-2013-09-11)

MADRID (MarketWatch) -- Even though recent political events have cut the chances for military intervention in Syria, risks to oil prices are still **skewed** to the **upside** over the next several months, said the commodities research team at Goldman Sachs in a note on Wednesday. Led by Jeffrey Currie, the analysts said some ease could come by October though, as pressure on Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries's spare capacity will likely peak this month in face of ongoing shortfalls from Libya and very low OECD petroleum stocks. "However, barring more serious spillover from Syria into the broader region, we expect the seasonal decline in oil demand in Saudi Arabia toward the end of the year and a gradual recovery in ex-Saudi OPEC crude-oil production levels will likely bring prices to levels consistent with a more **balanced market** by end 2013," Goldman said. Goldman's three- and six-month crude **forecasts** are $104 and $100 a barrel, respectively with a 12-month forecast of $96 a barrel. For Brent crude, Goldman predicts **$110**, $108 and $105 a barrel, respectively. See also Oil sees third day of losses as Syria risks recede and OPEC's predictions for Syria supply.

#### Cuban production ensures US energy independence --- the embargo is the only barrier

**Alhaiji 4** (Dr. A. F., Energy Economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics – Ohio Northern University, Terry L. Maris, Founding Executive Director – Center for Cuban Business Studies, Professor of Management – Ohio Northern University, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector”, Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

Introduction¶ The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition” refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily mean regime change. The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of **massive oil deposits** in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic, and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region. The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on one hand and **US energy policy** and **energy security** on the other. If US-Cuba relations improve in the future, discovery of **large oil deposits** could affect the energy trade patterns between the two countries and **affect oil trade** between the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

#### Drop in oil prices collapses the Russian economy --- overwhelms resiliency

**Zotin 8-30** (Aleksander, Columnist – Kommersant, “AN ECONOMIC CRISIS MAY BE LOOMING FOR RUSSIA”, Kommersant, 2013, http://www.worldcrunch.com/business-finance/an-economic-crisis-may-be-looming-for-russia/russia-economy-ruble-boris-yeltsin-global-crisis/c2s13220/)

MOSCOW — On Aug. 17, 1998, the Russian government announced a default on short-term obligations and a currency devaluation. The financial system was practically destroyed. Ten years later, in 2008, there was another crisis, this time a global one, that hit all the world’s economies, including Russia’s. There were both similarities and differences between the two crises — each resulted from internal and external shocks. But we haven’t learned our lessons from them, and there are reasons to be worried that a new economic catastrophe is on the **horizon**. Although it’s been five years since the last global crisis, it wouldn’t be accurate to say that the world economy is truly healthy. An exterior shock similar to the one that caused the economic collapses in 2008 and 1998 is still possible. In 2008, the epicenter of the crisis was the United States, but today the biggest threat comes from China — and from the fact that the entire developed world still balances on the edge of recession. If, in addition to that, there is a major shock from China, such as a slowdown in growth to just 3%, the world will be faced with another economic meltdown. A slowdown in demand for metals, for example, is already a menacing hint that this could happen. Ominous signs Nobody knows whether, or when, the global economy will suffer another body blow, but what is clear is that while Russia was relatively well-prepared for the 2008 crisis, we don’t have the same safety cushion today. Instead of a surplus, we have a deficit, and the non-oil and gas deficit is **exceptionally high**, with experts predicting that said deficit will be 10.7% of GDP this year. In 2007, the country adopted new rules about how income from oil and gas could be spent, and it was meant to be used increasingly for government savings. But the crisis wrecked that plan, as the government tried to spend its way out of its economic problems. Russia not only failed to save its income from the oil and gas industries during the crisis years, but it also **emptied** its **reserve fund**. The non-oil and gas deficit rose to 13.5% of GDP. The crisis of 2008-2009 passed, but Russia still didn’t heed the World Bank’s recommendation to keep the non-oil and gas deficit below 4% of GDP. The gold reserves are also less important now than they were in 2008, and the private sector’s international debt level is much higher. We are also **more vulnerable** now to **external shocks** than we were in 2008 because of domestic factors. We have witnessed economic stagnation this year even with high oil prices. There are also serious weaknesses in the Russian financial system. There has been a boom in credit and debt, which caused a quick rise in family incomes that has now become the expected norm. Consumer debt has now reached 15% of GDP. That’s low compared to other developed countries, but the advantages of having a low level of indebtedness are negated by the high cost of debt service and the fact that most of the debt is borrowed over very short terms. In fact, Russians spend 11% of their income paying down debt, more than even the United States, where citizens pay on average 10.5% of their income for debt service, researchers say. This is the case even though household debt is 78% of GDP in the United States, much higher than Russia’s 15%. If there is a **sharp drop** in prices for natural resources, a new crisis will be **unavoidable**. And there were not be many choices: either devalue the ruble or cut government spending.

#### The impact is nuclear war

**Filger 9** (Sheldon, Author – Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction”, http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

**In Russia**, historically, **economic** health **and** political **stability are intertwined** to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that **desperate personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations**. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### 1nc 3

#### Engagement’s limited now because of opposition by protectionist lobbies

Gvosdev 12 – Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Faculty of the U.S. Naval War College and Former Editor of the National Interest, “The Realist Prism: To Reset Latin America Policy, U.S. Must Think Big”, World Politics Review, 4-20, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11867/the-realist-prism-to-reset-latin-america-policy-u-s-must-think-big>)

U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere has suffered a series of setbacks over the past month. The first, the Washington summit earlier this month between Presidents Barack Obama and Dilma Rousseff of Brazil, was simply lackluster. The second, last weekend’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, was an outright fiasco. Instead of laying out a common agenda for the hemisphere and rebuilding America’s leadership role in the region, the U.S. found itself isolated in a diplomatic corner over Cuba, to say nothing of the Secret Service prostitution scandal that soon overshadowed the proceedings.

More generally, Obama’s Latin America policy is suffering from a lack of what George H.W. Bush famously called “the vision thing,” compounded by how the administration organizes the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. The president had an initial opening at his first Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, in 2009, to reset what had become a very problematic relationship between the United States and most of the rest of the hemisphere during the George W. Bush administration. Most regional leaders also made it clear they understood that, given the global financial crisis and the challenges of winding down America’s involvement in two Middle Eastern wars, Obama could not immediately pivot U.S. foreign policy to the region.

But as I noted two years ago, “There was insufficient follow-up to take advantage of the momentum generated by the Trinidad meeting.” Just as candidate George W. Bush’s rhetoric about the importance of Latin America understandably evaporated after Sept. 11, the Obama administration, in continuing to react to a series of crises elsewhere in the world, has also put the Western Hemisphere on the back burner.

As a result, according to Sean Goforth, America’s relations with the region appear to be adrift. “Many countries want and deserve a serious partnership with Washington. But President Obama is an unconvincing partner. . . . He has stalled on trade treaties with Latin American countries that still want preferred access to the U.S. market, and he’s made it clear that his strategic priority is a ‘pivot’ toward Asia.”

Worse still, no senior official within the administration, starting with the president himself, has articulated a clear, compelling and convincing vision for what a Western Hemispheric partnership would look like, beyond the expected bromides about peace, democracy and prosperity. What is the desired end state? There is no lack of compelling possibilities to choose from: free circulation for people, goods and capital from the Yukon to Tierra del Fuego; a greater push for regional independence, in terms of manufactured goods, services and energy; an arrangement that mimics the pre-Maastricht European Community.

Part of the problem is that important U.S. domestic lobbies are opposed to key pieces of what would be needed to promote greater regional integration -- from environmentalists concerned both about Canada’s oil sands and new pipeline projects that would transport more of Alberta’s hydrocarbons to U.S. refineries and markets to a formidable anti-immigration lobby that would be very hesitant to support a freer flow of labor between the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Add post-Sept. 11 security concerns and a prevailing view among many U.S. voters that free trade agreements usually come at the expense of the American worker, and it becomes more apparent why no U.S. politician has emerged as a strong advocate for a Community of the Americas.

And while domestic politics are always going to be intertwined with foreign policy, U.S. messaging, particularly in Cartagena, seemed to convey just how much a domestic U.S. agenda is driving interaction with the rest of the region. Whether intended or not, Washington’s continued emphasis on framing foreign engagement as a way to boost U.S. job numbers does not provide much incentive for other states to embrace the U.S. agenda, as Obama similarly discovered during visits to India and other states in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the unwillingness to alter the U.S. position on Cuba set the tone in Cartagena, reinforcing the perception that U.S. strategy toward the region is seen through the prism of domestic politics -- in this case Florida’s electoral votes.

#### Plan inflames domestic protectionism

McGinnis 00 – Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, “The World Trade Constitution”, Harvard Law Review, December, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511, Lexis

It is true that free trade does not make everyone within a nation better off, at least in the short term. Free trade displaces workers and owners in industries where the comparative advantage lies abroad, because it becomes cheaper for the nation to import the goods than to produce them domestically. [54](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n54" \t "_self) Workers often cannot change industries easily because they have nontransferable skills. Owners' capital, moreover, may not be mobile because the owners have invested it in industry-specific assets. As a result, workers and owners in industries that lack a comparative advantage stand to lose a significant portion of their income. [55](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n55" \t "_self) In the long run, free trade may make many of these workers and owners better off, as open borders create higher-paying jobs and higher returns to capital. [56](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n56" \t "_self) But the workers and owners may discount  [\*523]  these hopeful prospects. A well-known feature of human psychology called the "matching principle" suggests that people have difficulty calculating the current value of future benefits. [57](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n57" \t "_self) As a result, many people refuse to forgo a current benefit for future gain, even when the latter will be greater on a discounted basis. Thus, workers who fear the adverse effects of free trade may give scant consideration to the possibility of better jobs in the future, and owners scant consideration to the chance that they will increase their profits in another business. As a result of real monetary losses and the patterns of human psychology, then, workers and owners in industries adversely affected by free trade will try to persuade the government to erect protectionist barriers. [58](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n58" \t "_self) The realities of interest group politics suggest that they will enjoy significant success. [59](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n59" \t "_self) As concentrated groups, workers and owners can obtain substantial benefits from government action. [60](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n60" \t "_self) Consequently, these groups have strong incentives to provide campaign contributions and electoral support in return for protectionist policies. In contrast, groups that benefit from free trade, such as consumers, are diffuse, and their gains, though large in the aggregate, tend to be  [\*524]  small on an individual basis. [61](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n61" \t "_self) These groups have comparatively few incentives to contribute time and money to lobby for free trade policies. Moreover, they face high agency costs in monitoring legislators to determine whether their representatives are yielding to interest groups at the expense of society as a whole. [62](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n62" \t "_self) For these reasons, citizens may choose to remain "rationally ignorant" of almost all trade policy issues. [63](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n63" \t "_self) So far, this account is the relatively familiar story of interest group politics. [64](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n64" \t "_self) But protectionist groups enjoy an additional advantage: they can exploit nationalist sentiments. These sentiments, which are often deeply rooted in a country's tradition and culture, can have a positive impact on politics by encouraging the production of public goods. For example, they facilitate the common defense and aid in rallying opposition to totalitarian oppression, as in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War. [65](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n65" \t "_self) Unfortunately, these sentiments can also  [\*525]  provide cover for a variety of protectionist measures, like "Buy American" and domestic-content laws, that are designed to benefit interest groups at the expense of the public. [66](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=252a1e7e2d386b1ba6b40101866c799c&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkAt&_md5=b30d2a13fac6d9fc0fda717f09e57ece" \l "n66" \t "_self)

#### Lobbies will push restrictive regulatory measures --- wrecks trade and the economy

Watson 13 – K. William Watson and Sallie James, Trade Policy Analysts at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, “Regulatory Protectionism A Hidden Threat to Free Trade”, Cato Policy Analysis, 4-9, http://heartland.org/sites/default/files/pa723.pdf

Despite the impressive success of trade liberalization, domestic industries continue to find ways to use the power of government to protect themselves from foreign competition. The practice of using domestic environmental or consumer safety regulation as a way to disguise protectionist policy has become a serious and growing problem in the United States. This regulatory protectionism harms the U.S. economy and violates our trade obligations.

A number of factors combine to explain the rise in regulatory protectionism. Economic globalization has provided Americans with access to a wide range of imported products. This has enabled consumers to demand not only high-quality products at low cost but also products that are produced according to consumers’ philosophical or ethical preferences. Simultaneously, domestic producers seeking protection from this influx of imports must find alternative shelters now that the use of tariffs and quotas is constrained by international law and economic good sense. The consequence is a perfect storm in which social welfare activists and special commercial interests join forces to promote regulatory regimes that unfairly and unnecessarily restrict imports.

There is already a system of laws in place to prevent regulatory protectionism. The rules of the international trading system recognize that domestic laws can be just as protectionist as tariffs. Many of the disciplines of World Trade Organization (WTO) law are embedded in the rules U.S. administrative agencies follow when setting new regulations.

But the U.S. government must take its WTO obligations more seriously. Prior to implementing a new regulation, federal agencies should be required to evaluate the possibility that less trade-restrictive alternatives could meet regulatory goals as effectively as their preferred proposal. Also, the U.S. government should not dilute or bypass the multilateral rules of the WTO through bilateral or regional negotiations that accept managed protectionism.

This paper uses a number of recent examples of protectionist regulations to show that the enemies of regulatory protectionism are transparency and vigilance. Policymakers should be skeptical of regulatory proposals backed by the target domestic industry and of proposals that lack a plausible theory of market failure. These are red flags that the proposal is the product of privilege-seeking special interests disguised as altruistic consumer advocates.

#### Extinction

Kemp 10 (Geoffrey, Director of Regional Strategic Programs – Nixon Center and Former Director of the Middle East Arms Control Project – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-234)

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

### Transitions

#### Cuba won’t want to cooperate

Bloomberg 08 (Bloomberg Business Week. "Cuba: Snuff Out the Embargo". www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2008/06/cuba\_snuff\_out\_the\_embargo.html)

Regrettably, this outlook stems from a U.S.-centric vantage point extrapolated to the Cuban government. Embargo opponents make the flawed assumption that the current Cuban government is earnestly interested in close relations with its northern neighbor—and willing to jeopardize its total control and 50-year legacy of opposition to Yankee imperialism in exchange for an improvement in the economic well-being of Cubans. Raul Castro’s recent speech to Cuba’s National Assembly should put an end to that notion.

#### Economic relations won’t transform Cuba

Suchlicki 2k (Jaime Suchlicki, founding Director of the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. He is also the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor of History . June 2000. "The U.S. Embargo of Cuba". University of Miami. www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf)

There is no evidence that tourism, trade, or investment had anything to ¶ do with the collapse of communism. Tourism peaked in the Soviet Union in ¶ 1980, almost a decade before the collapse of communism. In the Soviet ¶ Union tourism was tightly controlled with few tourists having any contact ¶ with Russians. ¶ The collapse of Communism was the result of a decaying system that ¶ did not work, the corruption and inefficiency of the Communist Party, the ¶ economic bankruptcy of the Soviet Union in part because of military ¶ competition with the West, an unpopular war in Afghanistan, and the ¶ reformist policies of Mikhail Gorbachev that accelerated the process of ¶ change. The driving force for capitalism in Russia and China is not trade or ¶ investment but a strong domestic market economy, tolerated by the ¶ government and dominated by millions of small entrepreneurs. The will to ¶ liberalize the economy does not exist in Cuba.

#### cuba won’t want relations with the US

Suchlicki 13 (Jaime Sucklicki, director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. 1/14/13. "Raúl Castro’s Cuba in 2013". Miami Herald. www.miamiherald.com/2013/01/14/3178528/raul-castros-cuba-in-2013.html)

After six years in power, Gen. Raúl Castro is unwilling to chart a radically new course for Cuba or offer concessions to the U.S. Yet expectations remain that the younger Castro will follow the Chinese or the Vietnamese model and even find an accommodation with the United States.¶ Wrong on both counts. With Fidel alive, or even when he is dead, it would be difficult for Raúl to reject his brother’s legacy of political and economic centralization. Raúl’s legitimacy is based on being Fidel’s heir. Any major move to reject Fidel’s “teachings” would create uncertainty among Cuba’s ruling elites — party and military. It could also increase instability as some would advocate rapid change, while others cling to more orthodox policies. Cubans could see this as an opportunity for mobilization, demanding faster reforms.¶ For Raúl, the uncertainties of uncorking the genie’s bottle in Cuba are greater than keeping the lid on and moving cautiously. For the past 52 years, political considerations have always dictated economic policies.¶ Raúl does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S.-Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba.¶ Raúl is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and elsewhere, Raúl’s policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.¶ Raúl is no Deng Xiaoping and no friend of the United States.¶ He had been the longest serving Minister of Defense (47 years). He presided over the worst periods of political repression and economic centralization in Cuba and is responsible for numerous executions after he and his brother assumed power, and some while in Mexico and the Sierra Maestra before reaching power.¶ Raúl has been a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel’s anti-American policies and military interventions in Africa and elsewhere.

#### Turn – plan strengthens the regime, kills the economy, and undermines US influence in the region

**Suchlicki ‘13** (Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? 2/26/13, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/)

Lifting the ban for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concession totally out of proportion to recent changes in the island. If the U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major reforms in Cuba, there would be significant implications: Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother. American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba’s efficient security apparatus. Most Americans don’t speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best naïve. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S. travelers to Cuba could be subject to harassment and imprisonment. Over the past decades hundred of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cuba’s limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island’s economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro. Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the United States”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United States; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention, normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba, Castro would probably restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well-being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries. If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications.

#### Can’t solve the Cuban economy – too many structural failures

**Suchlicki, 12**- Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the University of Miami (Jaime, “Getting Ready for Life after Castro”, 5/11/12, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting\_ready\_for\_life\_after\_castro?page=full)](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting_ready_for_life_after_castro?page=full)//TL)

The challenges are many. First, there will be the tremendous task of economic reconstruction. For nearly four decades, Cuba's extreme dependence on the Soviet bloc for trade, and the distorting effects of huge subsidies from Moscow, created an artificial economy. Most of Cuba's exports are in decline, and poverty is correspondingly growing. The internal market is weak, as domestic consumption is controlled by a strict and severe rationing system. Many transactions take place in the illegal black market, which operates in American dollars and with merchandise stolen from state enterprises or received from abroad. The Cuban peso has depreciated and its purchasing power has waned considerably. Huge and persistent government deficits, and the absence of virtually any stabilizing fiscal and monetary policies, have accelerated the downward spiraling of the economy. (Socio-Economic Reconstruction: Suggestions and Recommendations for Post-Castro Cuba, Antonio Jorge, and Institutions to Accompany the Market in Cuba, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata).¶ Moreover, sugar production, Cuba's mainstay export, has dropped to Great Depression levels. With low prices, a decline in sugar consumption worldwide, an increase in the number of competitive sugar producers, and widespread use of artificial sweeteners, sugar is a losing commodity with dire prospects for the future. Thus tourism, nickel exports, and even exile remittances have replaced sugar as the mainstay of the economy. Oil exploration in Cuba's northwestern waters seems promising, but profits must be shared with foreign partners, and costs are extremely high.¶ In addition to these vexing economic realities, there will be also a maze of legal problems, particularly concerning foreign investment and the status of assets acquired during the Castro era. Obviously, Cuban nationals, Cuban-Americans, and foreigners whose properties were confiscated during the early years of the revolution will want to reclaim them or will ask for fair compensation. (Property Rights in the Post-Castro Cuban Constitution, Oscar M. Garibaldi and John D. Kirby; Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Properties in Post-Castro Cuba, Mátias F. Traviesco-Diáz.) The U.S. and other countries whose citizens' assets were seized without compensation are likely to support such demands. Cubans living abroad await the opportunity to exercise their legal claims before Cuban courts. The Eastern European and Nicaraguan examples vividly illustrate the complexities, delays, and uncertainties accompanying the reclamation process. (What Can Countries Embarking on Post-Socialist Transformation Learn from the Experiences So Far?, János Kornai).¶ Cuba's severely damaged infrastructure is in major need of rebuilding. The outdated electric grid cannot supply the needs of consumers and industry. Transportation is inadequate. Communication facilities are obsolete, and sanitary and medical facilitates have deteriorated so badly that contagious diseases constitute a real menace to the population. In addition, environmental concerns such as the pollution of bays and rivers require immediate intervention. (Environmental Concerns for a Cuba in Transition, Eudel Eduardo Cepero.)

#### The Cuban military will block any genuine economic or political reform

**Suchlicki, 12**- Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the University of Miami (Jaime, “Getting Ready for Life after Castro”, 5/11/12, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting\_ready\_for\_life\_after\_castro?page=full)](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting_ready_for_life_after_castro?page=full)//TL)

Economic and legal problems are not, however, the only challenges facing Cuba in the future. A major problem that will confront post-Castro Cuba is the power of the military. (The Cuban Military and Transition Dynamics, Brian Latell.) Cuba has a strong tradition of militarism, but in recent years, the military as an institution has acquired unprecedented power. Under any conceivable future scenario, the military will continue to be a decisive player. Like Nicaragua, Cuba may develop a limited democratic system in which Cubans are allowed to elect civilian leaders, but with the military exercising real power and remaining the final arbiter of the political process.¶ An immediate and significant reduction of the armed forces will be difficult, if not impossible. A powerful and proud institution, the military would see any attempt to undermine its authority as an unacceptable intrusion into its affairs and as a threat to its existence. Its control of key economic sectors under the Castro regime will make it difficult to dislodge it from these activities and to limit its role strictly to external security. Cutting the armed forces will also be problematic. The civilian economy may not be able to absorb large numbers of discharged soldiers quickly, especially if the government cannot come up with viable programs for retraining them.

#### Cuban economic decline impact is empirically denied—90s crash did not escalate

**Sweeney 94** – Former Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation (John, “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained,” Heritage Foundation, 11/10/94, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1994/11/bg1010nbsp-why-the-cuban-trade)

The Cuban Crisis¶ Cuba today is suffering its worst economic crisis since Fidel Castro seized power in 1959. The island's gross social product (equivalent to gross domestic product) has plunged nearly 60 percent, including this year's projected contraction of 5 percent. Power blackouts occur daily in Havana and other major cities. Over two-thirds of the island's industrial facilities are shut down almost permanently due to a lack of raw materials. Gasoline is very scarce, and automotive transportation is at a virtual standstill. Animal power is used for heavy agricultural activities, and most Cubans get about on bicycles or on foot. Over half of Cuba's work force is now unemployed, although unemployment officially remains a crime punishable by imprisonment.¶ Since July 1993, when the Castro regime authorized the use of U.S. dollars, Cuba's own currency has become worthless. Although the official exchange rate between the peso and the U.S. dollar is one-to-one, the black market rate in August was 130 pesos to the dollar. No one will work for pesos, since the minimum wage is now equivalent to about three dollars a month. Productivity has dropped 45 percent since 1990, according to Cuban economists, and many state employees no longer bother to go to work. Instead, they have joined the fast-swelling ranks of self-employed or black market workers whose economic activities are marked by the struggle to survive from one day to the next without earning too much income lest they be charged with illegal enrichment and jailed.¶ Many Cuban women have turned to prostitution in a desperate effort to feed their children and families, since government rationing provides only half of the average family's monthly nutrition needs. In May, Cuba's minimum wage would buy "only a two-pound chicken, or a pound of pork, or four liters of milk in unofficial markets." Many Cuban families now survive on one daily meal consisting of rice, beans, soy, and water. For months, Cubans have been deprived even of bath soap. Infectious diseases once thought to be eradicated, such as tuberculosis and malaria, are returning as Cuba's free health care system collapses. Hospitals lack even the most basic supplies such as bandages and surgical thread for sutures. There are not enough pencils and ruled paper to supply the country's school system.¶ Although some Cuban economists said the economy would "hit bottom" in 1994, the poor performance of the critical sugar industry indicates that the crisis actually will grow substantially worse during 1995. Sugar production has dropped from an estimated 8.1 million metric tons in 1989 to barely 4.2 million metric tons last year. This year's crop will be even lower; one reliable estimate forecasts 4 million metric tons for 1994 and 3.5 million metric tons for 1995.

#### **FDI in Cuba fails**

Suchlicki 13 (Jaime Suchlicki, Professor of History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. April 2013. "What if…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? by Jaime Suchlicki". devresearchcenter.org/2013/04/12/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/)

All trade with Cuba is done with state owned businesses. Since Cuba has very little credit and is a major debtor nation, the U.S. and its businesses would have to provide credits to Cuban enterprises. There is a long history of Cuba defaulting on loans.¶ Cuba is not likely to buy a substantial amount of products in the U.S. Cuba can buy in any other country and it is not likely to abandon its relationship with China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to become a major trading partner of the U.S.¶ Cuba has very little to sell in the U.S.¶ Investments¶ In Cuba, foreign investors cannot partner with private Cuban citizens. They can only invest in the island through minority joint ventures with the government and its state enterprises.¶ The dominant enterprise in the Cuban economy is the Grupo GAESA, controlled by the Cuban military. Most investments are done through or with GAESA. Therefore, American companies willing to invest in Cuba will have to partner mostly with the Cuban military.¶ Cuba ranks 176 out of 177 countries in the world in terms of economic freedom. Outshined only by North Korea. It ranks as one of the most unattractive investments next to Iran, Zimbabwe, Libya, Mali, etc.¶ Foreign investors cannot hire, fire, or pay workers directly. They must go through the Cuban government employment agency which selects the workers. Investors pay the government in dollars or euros and the government pays the workers a meager 10% in Cuban pesos.¶ Corruption is pervasive, undermining equity and respect for the rule of law.

### 1nc Latin American Relations

Cuba is not key to relations- too many alt causes

Suchlicki 2k (Jaime Suchlicki, founding Director of the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. He is also the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor of History . June 2000. "The U.S. Embargo of Cuba". University of Miami. www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf)

Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The ¶ U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, ¶ transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual ¶ property rights. Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda. ¶ While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, ¶ privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments ¶ from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to ¶ Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.

**Relations resilient**

**Duddy and Mora 13** – \*U.S. ambassador to Venezuela from 2007 until 2010 and is currently visiting senior lecturer at Duke University; \*\* incoming director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, and former deputy assistant secretary of Defense, Western Hemisphere (Patrick and Frank O., “Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?” Miami Herald, 5/1/13, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy)//Bwang

As President Obama travels to Mexico and Costa Rica, it’s likely the pundits will once again underscore what some perceive to be the eroding influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Some will point to the decline in foreign aid or the absence of an overarching policy with an inspiring moniker like “Alliance for Progress” or “Enterprise Area of the Americas” as evidence that the United States is failing to embrace the opportunities of a region that is more important to this country than ever.¶ The reality is a lot more complicated. Forty-two percent of all U.S. exports flow to the Western Hemisphere. In many ways, U.S. engagement in the Americas is more pervasive than ever, even if more diffused. That is in part because the peoples of the Western Hemisphere are not waiting for governments to choreograph their interactions.¶ A more-nuanced assessment inevitably will highlight the complex, multidimensional ties between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere. In fact, it may be that we need to change the way we think and talk about the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. We also need to resist the temptation to embrace overly reductive yardsticks for judging our standing in the hemisphere.¶ As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there has been an important change in power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of cross-national relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration.¶ Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region. Many observers who worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the presence of European companies and investors.¶ While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements.¶ An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs.¶ From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product.¶ Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture, values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chávez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists.

#### Improving relations is impossible without reforming the entire foreign policy apparatus

**Gvosdev, 12** - former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College (Nikolas, “To Reset Latin America Policy, U.S. Must Think Big,” 4/20, World Politics Review, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11867/the-realist-prism-to-reset-latin-america-policy-u-s-must-think-big>)

More generally, Obama’s Latin America policy is suffering from a lack of what George H.W. Bush famously called “the vision thing,” compounded by how the administration organizes the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. The president had an initial opening at his first Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, in 2009, to reset what had become a very problematic relationship between the United States and most of the rest of the hemisphere during the George W. Bush administration. Most regional leaders also made it clear they understood that, given the global financial crisis and the challenges of winding down America’s involvement in two Middle Eastern wars, Obama could not immediately pivot U.S. foreign policy to the region. ¶ But as I noted two years ago, “There was insufficient follow-up to take advantage of the momentum generated by the Trinidad meeting.” Just as candidate George W. Bush’s rhetoric about the importance of Latin America understandably evaporated after Sept. 11, the Obama administration, in continuing to react to a series of crises elsewhere in the world, has also put the Western Hemisphere on the back burner.¶ As a result, according to Sean Goforth, America’s relations with the region appear to be adrift. “Many countries want and deserve a serious partnership with Washington. But President Obama is an unconvincing partner. . . . He has stalled on trade treaties with Latin American countries that still want preferred access to the U.S. market, and he’s made it clear that his strategic priority is a ‘pivot’ toward Asia.”¶ Worse still, no senior official within the administration, starting with the president himself, has articulated a clear, compelling and convincing vision for what a Western Hemispheric partnership would look like, beyond the expected bromides about peace, democracy and prosperity. What is the desired end state? There is no lack of compelling possibilities to choose from: free circulation for people, goods and capital from the Yukon to Tierra del Fuego; a greater push for regional independence, in terms of manufactured goods, services and energy; an arrangement that mimics the pre-Maastricht European Community.

**Too many alt causes to Cuba relations**

**Hanson & Lee ‘13**

Stephanie Hanson and Brianna Lee, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, 1/31/13 http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113

What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations? Experts say these issues include: Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006. Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period. Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.

#### Latin America impacts are empirically denied

**Hartzell 2k** (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-28765765\_ITM)

Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?

**C) Iraq**

OA 7 (Oxford Analytica, “Anti-American Sentiment Grows Worldwide”, 8-23, http://www.mail-archive.com/sustainablelorgbiofuel@sustainablelists.org/msg70843.html)

Democracy promotion. The invasion of Iraq has **undermined the credibility** of U.S. democracy promotion programs. After the failure to find weapons of mass destruction, the United States and United Kingdom described the invasion as bringing democracy to Iraq, in turn having a domino effect of democratization in the wider Middle East. Anti-Americanism has ebbed and flowed in the past. The current wave has arisen in reaction to the perceived and actual policies of the Bush administration and the invasion of Iraq. In the 1980s and again today, anti-Americanism became mainstream. In the 1990s, anti-Americanism was marginalized, and this is likely to happen again, with the arrival of a new U.S. president and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq.

**-- Democracy promotion fails – 3 reasons**

 --Idealized American Model --Inattentiveness to Power ---Assumption of Orderly Progress

Alford 00 (William P., Professor East Asian Legal Studies – Harvard Law, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1677, May, Lexis)

Carothers's assessment of the core strategy underlying American democracy promotion programs is incisive, even as it builds, in a tempered  [\*1687]  manner, on concerns of the type that David Trubek and Marc Galanter expressed in their celebrated 1974 study Scholars in Self-Estrangement. n27 At the most general level, Carothers identifies three major shortcomings. First, U.S. democracy promotion programs have drawn far too much and far too uncritically on idealized American models. Practices that may be quite understandable in one setting (such as "American-style legal activism") may "have grown out of particular aspects of America's social makeup and history - whether the immigrant character of society, the "frontier' mindset, the legacy of suspicion of central government authority, or the high degree of individualism" (p. 98). As such, they may not map effectively even onto civil law democracies in Europe, let alone developing nations. Second, the core strategy seems remarkably, if not even willfully, inattentive to political, social, or economic power in recipient nations. This inattentiveness tends to lead to an undue and often naive emphasis on formal, as opposed to substantive, change. "Aid providers," writes Carothers, "treat political change in a pseudoscientific manner as a clinical process to be guided by manuals, technical seminars, and flowcharts specifying the intended outputs and timeframes" (p. 102). The third general flaw in American thinking has been its assumption that there is an orderly and universally valid process of democratization. Experience, indicates Carothers, argues against this notion, suggesting that programs that are insufficiently supple and flexible may collapse of their own weight as events depart from the stages that methodical sequencing would seem to prescribe (pp. 108-13).

**-- Cyber-terror fails, won’t cause meltdowns, and Cuba isn’t key**

Alexander 3 (Steve, Staff – Star Tribune, “The Cyberterror Scare”, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), 2-13, Lexis)

For years, government Internet experts have warned a "cyberterrorism" attack could steal national secrets, interrupt electric power, disrupt flight control systems, or worse, amounting to "an electronic Pearl Harbor." But these days, a less alarmist viewpoint is emerging from experts who say **the comparison is overblown**. They liken the cyberterrorism threat to the approach of the **Y2K bug**, which featured much-publicized warnings of worldwide computer malfunctions that **never materialized**. "There are security problems on the Internet, but they are **not a threat to national security**," said James Lewis, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, D.C. That's because America's important computer networks, "are more distributed, diverse, redundant and self-healing than a cursory assessment may suggest," Lewis said. What's more, he says, attacks on water treatment and power plants, dams, nuclear weapons laboratories and commercial aircraft flight control systems are unlikely because the computer systems running them are complex, sometimes old and, in some cases, not connected to the Internet. But that view is vastly different from those espoused by former White House adviser Richard Clark, who served the Clinton and Bush administrations, before resigning last month. Clarke, who made the "Pearl Harbor" remark, said though a cyberattack might not cause many deaths, it could hurt the U.S. economy and weaken the nation's ability to respond to a crisis. Variety of opinions But just as often these days, experts such as Lewis are sounding their more modest concerns. They don't all agree. Their views range from believing cyberterrorism is unlikely to maintaining it is virtually impossible. Lewis said a cyberattack would be very complex to pull off. "A hacker or even a large group of hackers would need to find vulnerabilities in multiple systems to significantly disrupt the power supply, and even then, an attack might only disrupt service for a few hours," he said. What's more, the greatest terrorist threat to the electric power grid remains some kind of physical attack on power lines or generators, he said. By comparison, "electronic intrusion represents an emerging but still **relatively minor threat**." Sounding a slightly different note, experts at Symantec Corp., a California computer security firm, won't rule out cyberterrorism, but say they've never seen anything remotely like it. The company, which constantly scans the Internet to stay abreast of new threats, said its routine monitoring of Internet attacks indicates a lack of technical skill in potential terrorist nations. Hacker activity emanating from countries on the firm's Cyber Terrorist Watch List "suggests that attackers from these countries rely on relatively **antiquated hacking techniques**," Symantec said in its "Internet Security Threat Report" for the second half of 2002. The watch list is made up of countries the U.S. State Department says are "state sponsors of terrorism" and nations from which terrorists reportedly have operated and recruited in the past. Can they do it? Mark Higgins, manager of trending and analysis at Symantec, said the question is not whether cyberterrorism is possible, but "whether the enemy has cyberterrorist capability. Maybe not." However, it is difficult to say with certainty that a particular country lacks top-notch hackers, Higgins said. That's because a hacker might not be in the country from which his or her attack appears to originate. Instead, the hacker can remotely commandeer a computer in another country to conceal his or her identity. Others say a cyberattack could happen, but with only minimal impact. That's what computer market-research firm Gartner found after cooperating in a cyberwar game with the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island last summer. The scenario had a group of technology executives attempting to concoct a cyberterrorist attack on electrical components in the nation's power grid, or on valves in U.S. water treatment plants and oil or gas pipelines. The technology executives said they could envision such a scenario, but it wasn't devastating to the nation and was probably beyond the capabilities of today's terrorists, Connecticut-based Gartner said. "They didn't feel an attack would be at the level of a digital Pearl Harbor, but they felt it could be pretty bad, and certainly well above nuisance value," said French Caldwell, Gartner's research director. "It's just a matter of the amount of time it would take terrorists to develop these capabilities. We think that, sometime in the next two years, someone will develop a targeted attack on a critical piece of U.S. infrastructure." Vandalism rises As a result of these technical barriers to mounting a cyberattack, what the world has seen instead of cyberterrorism is a continuation of cyber-vandalism by hackers. In January, the SQL Slammer worm managed to infect much of the Internet in just 10 minutes, slowing the Internet and shutting down computer servers in many countries. There was no damage aimed solely at the United States, leading experts to conclude that, at least for now, the nation seems more threatened by cyberworms than by cyberwars. "The only cyberterrorism of consequence today is the global denial of service attack, which basically paralyzes the Internet and affects everyone," said Righard Zwienenberg, a senior research and development engineer at Norman Data Defense Systems in Oslo, Norway. But even a successful denial of service attack \_ in which Internet computer servers are flooded with pointless messages to render them inoperative \_ proves to be its own undoing, he said. "If someone launches a successful attempt, they will have only a short time to exploit it. Because once the technique is discovered, all the computer security firms will add it to their detection software." Steve Alexander is at alex@startribune.com. **A tiny threat** Countries on Symantec's Cyber Terrorist Watch List are the source of **less than 1 percent of attacks** on corporate networks. - Where attacks originated, 7/1/02 to 12/31/02: North America 38.9% Asia 29.1% Europe 25.6% Other 5.5% Cyber Terrorist Watch List **0.9%** Countries on the list Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates